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SCHOLARSHIP OF THE ABSURD: BOB BORK 
MEETS THE BALD SOPRANO 
Alex Kozinski* 
A.NrlTR.UST EcONOMICS ON TRIAL: A DIALOGUE ON THE NEW 
LAISSEZ-FAIRE. By Walter Adams and James W. Brock. Princeton: 
JPrinceton pniversity Press. 1991. Pp. xiv, 132. Cloth, $29.95; paper, 
$10.95. 
"It's a simple yes-or-no question, sir: Have you or have you not 
stopped beating your dog?" This (probably) apocryphal cross-exami-
nation question, familiar to every lawyer, has much in common with 
Walter Adams and James W. Brock's Antitrust Economics on Trial: A 
Dialogue on the New Laissez-Faire. 1 The format of the book is cute -
too cute by half. You are a spectator at the voir dire of an expert 
witness proffered by the defense in an antitrust merger case. The other 
participants are the prosecuting attorney and a district judge; there's 
no defense lawyer. It's a clever little device, with an aura of plausibil-
ity and respectability that belies the fundamental unfairness of the ap-
proach taken. 
Adams and Brock put on the stand for our amusement a fictitious 
Chicago-school economist of the libertarian bent - a caricature of the 
genre. He is "currently professor of economics at the University of 
Chicago, a fellow at the Cato Institute, and a consultant to the Heri-
tage Foundation" (p. 3) who has published "in the Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory, the Journal of Political Economy, the Journal of Law 
and Economics, the Journal of Business, and the University of Chicago 
Law Review" (p. 4) - all but one of which, as the prosecutor points 
out, are published by the University of Chicago. The authors assure 
us, however, that "[t]he expert is not set up as a straw man uttering 
lines concocted by partisan playwrights" (p. xiii). 
Oh sure. You can tell this is a setup when our expert's first three 
examples of price theory in action are crime,2 family relations3 and 
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Thanks to my law clerk 
Mark Perry, who, in the interest of full disclosure, did attend the University of Chicago Law 
School. I, myself, hold an undergraduate degree in economics from UCLA, widely known as the 
University of Chicago at Los Angeles. 
1. Walter Adams is Distinguished University Professor of Economics, Michigan State Uni-
versity. James W. Brock is Moeckel Professor of Business, Miami University. 
2. "[C]riminals are about like anyone else .... [T]he decision to become a criminal is in 
principle no different from the decision to become a bricklayer or a carpenter, or, indeed, an 
economist." Pp. 6-7. 
3. "[T]he physical and emotional involvement called love has an important economic compo-
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extramarital affairs. 4 While some economists have indeed sought to 
apply principles of economic theory to situations outside the business 
world, it is extremely misleading to offer these as mainstream exam-
ples which "reflect the worldview of the so-called New Learning (Chi-
cago school), which is currently popular in the federal judiciary" (p. 
xiii). 
When the subject finally turns· to antitrust, many of the exchanges 
between the prosecutor and the economist are educational. The sec-
tion on price theory and its relation to antitrust, the theory of competi-
tion and the harmful effects of monopoly (pp. 15-26) is a particularly 
lucid and brief exposition of basic antitrust analysis. More often, how-
ever (and this becomes truer the deeper one gets into the book), the 
prosecutor's questions seem designed not to elicit information but to 
discredit the expert's approach by holding it up to ridicule and scorn. 
Here, apparently, is the major theme: Microeconomic theory is of du-
bious applicability to antitrust policy and practice. Of course, Adams 
and Brock claim no agenda - "[o]ur purpose is not to preach a ser-
mon or to impart a message or to declare a winner" (pp. xiii-xiv) -
but by the end of the book economic analysis bears a strong resem-
blance to a whipped cur with his tail between his legs. 
And the hand that done the beating is the economist's own. Ad-
ams and Brock are able to define precisely the role of each character, 
and they help the prosecutor lead the befuddled expert down blind 
alleys. Worse, they do not allow the participants the benefit of a level 
playing field: The economist offers theory, which the prosecutor re-
buts with anecdote and empirical observation. But instead of giving 
the expert some empirical ammunition with which to fire back, the 
authors leave him sputtering. 
At one point, for example, the expert is discussing the efficiency 
effects of conglomerate mergers when the prosecutor points out that 
some real-world conglomerates have had business problems (pp. 82-
85). The authors relegate the expert to techno-babble: "In an econ-
omy where allocation of investment funds by the capital market incurs 
nontrivial transaction costs, the internal allocation of resources to 
higher yield uses is what most commends the conglomerate firm. In 
these circumstances, the conglomerate assumes miniature capital mar-
ket responsibilities of an energizing kind" (p. 85). Why not let the 
expert respond by pointing to successful real-world conglomerates 
(and there are many), or by pointing out either empirical or theoretical 
explanations for the prosecutor's examples? Instead, the expert is 
made to look pompous and silly. The prosecutor retorts: "Your 
nent." P. 8. "Children are much like cars, houses, and machinery. They can be considered 
consumer durables, which provide utility to their parents." P. 9. 
4. "Price theorists have developed a model that explains how a married person allocates his 
or her time among work, spouse, and paramour." P. 10. 
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points are well taken in theory, but they remind me of the anti-En-
lightenment philosopher Johann Fichte, who insisted that so long as 
his conclusions were deduced rigidly and correctly, he saw no reason 
to inquire whether they were true in reality" (p. 87). 
But of course this expert is no expert at all: He is a creation of 
Adams and Brock, and his bumbling, often funny, recourse to theoret-
ical abstractions in the face of the prosecutor's arguments is only a 
literary device. "To return to the hypothetical," he blurts out at one 
point when the prosecutor is getting the better of him (p. 60) . 
. Chicago-school antitrust analysis can be, and has been, criticized 
on a number of grounds; Adams and Brock have been among the zes-
tiest critics. 5 Yet this book represents criticism of a more insidious 
sort: Our expert, champion of the Chicago school, damns it with his 
own words. As we all know, this can be far more effective than ordi-
nary criticism. 6 But what if the expert could speak words not put in 
his mouth by those who think him a charlatan or a fool? 
Let's look at just one of the many areas of antitrust policy consid-
ered by Adams and Brock: contestability theory. As the expert ex-
plains it in the book, 
[the theory of contestable markets] is a generalization of the theory of 
perfect competition. A perfectly contestable market is characterized by 
optimal behavior and can exist within a full range of industry structures, 
including even monopoly and oligopoly. The analysis vastly extends the 
domain of the invisible hand. It shows that even in highly concentrated 
markets, the price, in equilibrium, must be exactly equal to marginal cost 
(as it would be under perfect competition), and that resource allocation 
will be optimal . . . . 
... [P]otential entry into or competition for the market disciplines 
behavior almost as effectively as would actual competition within the 
market. Thus, even if a market is dominated by a single firm, it is con-
testable and will perform in a competitive fashion. [p. 27; citations 
omitted] 
5. A good example with a fairly self-explanatory title is Walter Adams & James W. Brock, 
The "New Leaming" and the Euthanasia of Antitrust, 74 CAL. L. REv. 1515 (1986) [hereinafter 
Adams & Brock, Euthanasia of Antitrust]. In fact, Adams and Brock seem to have developed a 
two-man cottage industry devoted to rooting out the evils of what they call the "new learning." 
See, e.g., WALTER ADAMS & JAMES W. BROCK, DANGEROUS PURSUITS: MERGERS & ACQUISI-
TIONS IN THE AGE OF WALL STREET (1989); WALTER ADAMS & JAMES W. BROCK, THE BIG-
NESS CoMPLEX (1986); Walter Adams & James W. Brock, Joint Ventures, Antitrust, and 
Transnational Cartelization, 11 Nw. J. INTL. L. & Bus. 433 (1991); Walter Adams & James W. 
Brock, The Political Economy of Antitrust Exemptions, 29 WASHBURN L.J. 215 (1990); Walter 
Adams & James W. Brock, Vertical Integration, Monopoly Power, and Antitrust Policy: A Case 
Study of Video Entertainment, 36 WAYNE L. REV. 51 (1989); James W. Brock, Structural Mo-
nopoly, Technological Performance, and Predatory Innovation: Relevant Standards Under Section 
2 of the Sherman Act, 21 AM. Bus. L.J. 291 (1983); Walter Adams & James W. Brock, Deregula-
tion or Divestiture: The Case of Petroleum Pipelines, 19 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 705 (1983). 
6. See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2419, 2425 (1991) (recognizing 
persuasive effect of self-damnation). 
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The prosecutor counters with the example of the airline industry, in-
cluding the major airlines' computerized reservation systems (CRSs), 
which he characterizes as "barriers to entry" into the industry. 
It's too bad the expert didn't have the benefit of the Ninth Circuit's 
recent decision in Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 7 which 
applied Chicago-school economic analysis to real-world facts, to help 
deflect the prosecutor's attack. In that case, several small airlines sued 
the two giants (United and American), charging that their operation 
of CRSs (Apollo and SABRE, respectively) violated the Sherman Act. 
The plaintiffs' theory seems to have been quite similar to Adams and 
Brock's: The CRSs were alleged to be essential to competition in the 
airline industry, and the large firms, by denying access to the CRSs, 
therefore wielded an anticompetitive advantage. 8 The court rejected 
this argument. 
Because United and American each controls only about twelve to 
fourteen percent of the air transportation market, they rely on other 
airlines subscribing to their CRSs in order to make the sefvices attrac-
tive to travel agents. But "[b ]asic economic theory tells us that plain-
tiffs will withdraw from SABRE or Apollo if the cost of using either 
CRS causes the cost to the airline of providing a flight booked on a 
CRS to exceed the revenue that the airline gains by providing the 
flight."9 Thus, neither United nor American will use its dominant po-
sition in the CRS market to gain any anticompetitive advantage, be-
cause the smaller airlines would simply cease to use the services. The 
court's theoretical approach to the problem squared with the facts of 
the case: 
United and American have never refused any of the plaintiffs access to 
their respective CRSs. Rather, United and American have always given 
all of their competitors in the air transportation market such access for a 
fee. Neither United nor American have ever set this fee at a level that 
would drive their competitors away .... [I]t is unlikely that defendants 
would set their fee at such a level, for if they did, they would destroy 
their CRSs rather than their competition.10 
The expert might also have offered as a counterexample another 
recent Ninth Circuit case, United States v. Syufy Enterprises. 11 Ray-
mond Syufy bought almost all the first-run movie theaters in Las 
Vegas, Nevada; the government sued. The district court, following a 
trial, held that Syufy had not violated the antitrust laws. The court of 
appeals held that the facts of the case compelled a finding of no liabil-
ity: "In 1985, Syufy managed to lock up exclusive exhibition rights to 
7. 948 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1991), cert denied, No. 91-1242, 1992 WL 24283 (Apr. 6, 1992). 
8. 948 F.2d at 542. 
9. 948 F.2d at 545. 
10. 948 F.2d at 545 (footnote and citations omitted). 
11. 903 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1990). 
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91 % of all the first-run films in Las Vegas. By the first quarter of 
1988, that percentage had fallen to 39% .... " 12 This finding was 
exactly what economic theory teaches us to expect: In the absence of 
barriers to entry, any firm that raises its prices to a supracompetitive 
level will entice other firms to enter the market and undersell the 
would-be monopolist. 13 The opinion noted that "[i]t is a tribute to the 
state of competition in America that the Antitrust Division of the De-
partment of Justice has found no worthier target than this paper tiger 
on which to expend limited taxpayer resources."•4 
But Adams and Brock's expert is given no such ammunition. He 
sits helpless as the prosecutor pillories him and economic theory. Oc-
casionally the expert all but concedes the futility of his discipline: 
"We just have to recognize that economists, like other scientists, tend 
to measure what is measurable and forget about the rest, even though 
what is not measured may be vastly more important than what is mea-
sured" (p. 40). 
There is really nothing wrong with the method Adams and Brock 
have chosen to advance their ideas: Lampooning the other side's 
views by making them say things that are silly, pompous, unrespon-
sive, or inappropriate is a common device in academic literature. 
And, Smith knows, the landscape of economic scholarship is littered 
with enough overstatements and contradictions that one can come up 
with a humdinger of a satire by picking and choosing one's examples 
carefully - as Adams and Brock obviously have. 
But the authors here are more ambitious. Starting with the subtitle 
of the book - "A Dialogue on the New Laissez-Faire" - and ending 
with the back cover, which carries laudatory quotations attesting to 
the "evenhanded[ness]" of the discourse, the authors present this as a 
balanced debate - an unbiased exposition of conflicting viewpoints. 
This claim is belied not only by the book's contents - which even the 
nonexpert reader will recognize are anything but evenhanded - but 
by the fact that both of the authors are aligned with one side of the 
debate. 15 Although the authors have chosen a courtroom setting, they 
12. 903 F.2d at 666. 
13. 903 F.2d at 664; see also 903 F.2d at 663 ("[L]ike all antitrust cases, this one must make 
economic sense."). Syufy involved a claim of monopsony, rather than monopoly, but the contest-
ability analysis is the same: Any firm that attempts to wield its buying power anticompetitively 
gives incentives to other firms to overbid it and to the sellers to deal with the new entrants rather 
than the dominant firm. 
, 14. 903 F.2d at 672. I was the author of Syufy. There are those who have suggested that 
there's more to the opinion than meets the eye. See, e.g., The Syufy Rosetta Stone, 1992 B.Y.U. 
L. REv. 457; L. Gordon Crovitz, Verdict: Frantic Antitrust Ideas are Gone With the Wind, 
WALL ST. J., May 23, 1990, at A23. No comment. 
15. See supra note 6. In one of their earlier works, Adams and Brock make many of the 
same arguments, using many of the same examples, and conclude that "[t]his 'new learning' is 
stale wine in musty bottles." Adams & Brock, Euthanasia of Antitrust, supra note 6, at 1547. By 
this measure, Adams and Brock's book might be described as flat ale in a fresh mug. 
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have rejected the philosophy of the adversary system: that truth is 
advanced by having advocates vigorously argue both sides of the issue. 
Adams and Brock do a fine job of pointing out some of the limita-
tions and shortcomings of modem economic theory. But it would 
have been helpful to their cause - and the cause of truth - had they 
selected as coauthor one or more of the distinguished economists their 
expert parodies: Judges Bork, Posner, or Easterbrook; Professors Bax-
ter, Demsetz, or Landes. While the authors carefully cite one of these 
economists for each of the expert's responses, what guarantee do we 
have that these are their best responses - or even appropriate ones? 
At the very least, the authors might have circulated a draft of their 
manuscript to some of their colleagues whose works they skewer; one 
searches the preface and acknowledgment page in vain for the custom-
ary list of scholars who provided input during the drafting process. 
Were the authors afraid that flesh-and-blood Chicago-school econo-
mists would manage to come up with more convincing answers than 
their dummy expert? Without such a minimal reality check, Adams 
and Brock's claim of evenhandedness rings hollow:. 
* * * 
Aficionados of the theater of the absurd, the authors end the intro-
duction to this "Dialogue" with an excerpt from Eugene Ionesco's The 
Bald Soprano: "Mrs. Martin asks 'What is the message?' The Fire-
man replies, 'That is for you to find out' " (p. xiv). But the message 
here is no mystery. Far more fitting an allegory is presented in the 
movie Svengali:16 A bearded, wild-eyed John Barrymore in the title 
role has just hypnotized the young and beautiful Trilby (Marian 
Marsh) into professing her love for him. Yet he turns away in disgust, 
muttering: "It is only Svengali talking to himself again." Yes indeed. 
16. SVENGALI (Warner Brothers 1931). 
